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SIL-UND Workpapers 1970
D. THOHAS ON THE LIA.L"'1.' S PARADOX 
by Paul Heller.ta 
Dr. Th01:1as' paper is to be applauded us an indication 
that sor.1e Uycliff'e lincuists have joined in the crouincr 
rapproche::1ent betueen linguists and p::ilooopllers of lancuage. 
Philosophers have devoted 1:1uch attention to subtle analyses 
of' the se::1antics of certain subparts of luncuace, na::1ely 
those whic~1 arc 11 p:1ilosophically intereotinc. 11 :IO't·,ever 
li!:1itcd tl:is corpus 1:my be, it behooveo li.ne,-<.1.ists to find out 
:1ow :~mch o:f the se::iantic ,-,ork of philonopl:ero cnn be salvaged 
f'or use in deal inc Hi th se:·:1antics in linc;ui.lstics. Sir.lilarly, 
those locicians of' wide vision ,.,ho ,-Tio:: to c::7)a.ncl t11.e notation 
of' sy1:1bolic locic to capture 1:1orc o:f t:1e cletnil o:'.: natural 
lan[,'U.aceo, can l1ope to profit f'ro::1 t:10 ,-,orl~ of' lincuiots, now 
that the latter have becun to study sc::mntics in a serious 
way. This ::1Utually profitable arrr.'..nce:.1ent depends, 2101-,cver, 
on lincuists undcrstandinc the coals of' ::_J:l.iloaoi.J::.1er::; (and 
vice veroa, of course). It is uy :1opc t::.1at ul1£'..t I sn.y here 
;m be oi' ao::.c :::.elp in prouotina sue:: 1.:.nde1.~otu11c.i11c. 'I'lle 
bibliocrap!1y at tho end of' this paper also intended to steer 
linguists to philosophical literature havinc to do ,-Tith 
1;1atters of' general linc;uistic intercat, as uell as to articles 
dealing spccific.:i.lly with the liar's paradox. 
A Philosophical Bias aGainnt Grai:l::mr 
Dertrand ~usscll, whose ,-,ork was cited in the preceding 
piece, shared Hi th ::1any other philosop:1cr:::; o:f the early 
twentieth century a distrust of' gra::n:mr and of' everyday 
languace. l1ussoll clai!:1od that a study o:f 1:1ore synta:: would 
discover nothinc ,-rronG 1·.ri th the sentence, "Proc.:.~astination 
drinks quadruplicity, 11 He was interested in hcarinc an 
account of ·why this sentence is odd, hut apparently t:1e 
gra::l!.1ar he learned in school told hi::1 that the sentence was 
perfectly ,-rell-for::!cd. T:1us the se::1antic anm:ialy of' this 
sentence, whic:: is of' nt least so::10 p!:ilosop:lical interest, 
was out::.ide the ocope of' crammar as Tiusoell t.mclerstood it. 
A philosop:ier could be misled if he listened to t:lin oort 
of' graz:u:1ar. 
'I'oday, :~us aell • s point is uidely rccoc;:1izec~, in various 
teri:1S, by line; .. 1isto. In tag::10::licn, a. lexical lleirarclly 
separate :fro::: t:10 crau::1atical is req·_,i;.~ecl because of sl::e,·1ing 
between se::1antic and gra1:n:1aticnl strl." ..ctureo; transi'or: :c:-..tional 
gra::r::mrians distincuish deep and surface structure; and 
stratif'icational crrarn:mr has lexeuic ancl ser.iemii.c strata to 
account f'or phe110!:1ena that are not cra:_1::10.ticaJ.. in the usual 
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narrow sense. Linguists Generally have broadened their goals 
to include Givinc an account of' se!:1antic well-for:;icdncss, the 1 
paraphrase or synonymy relation amonc expressions, and so on. 
1u. V. Quine, in~.§! Logical Point.££~' caintains that 
linguists need only give~ correct account of the conditions 
under which a sentence has r:ieanina ( se:::nntic i:-Tell-:for::1edness) 
and the concli tiono under ,;·1llich two expreo8ions have the sar.1e 
:nenninc ( synony::1y). Quine feels that if a crra::1::1ar can d-;--
thesc t,-10 things, it can do all that ue llc.ve a richt to ask 
of' a gr amr.1ar . 
In addition to ,-,antinG an account of se::mntic ill-
:fori:10dness, as e;:::eupli::'ied in t:10 sentence about procras-
tination, p:!.iloso:):wrs uanted to cive ( or Got) an explan-
ation of another class of sentences: those t·1:1ich, al though 
well-:for::1ed in all respects, were necessarily :false. These 
sentences, called contradictions, could be seen to be :false 
by anyone ,-rho knew their ::ieaninc; no e::::perience or observation 
(beyond tlla t necessary to learn the non.nine oi' t::e sentence) 
was needed to deteri:line t:1eir f'alsi ty. Tllo denic.l of a 
contradiction is Ol1 the u21ole necesnariJ_y true. Thus "Ji::1 1 s 
father llas a uo:~mn" is a contradiction, but it is ~1ocessarily 
true that "Ji::1 1 n, father 1-1as not a uo1:mn. 11 One ai::1 in 
f'orr:1ulatinc sy::,bolic locic was to define these tuo related 
sets of' sentences, contradictions and necessarily tr-~1e sen-
tences, usinc a notation that {Save only tl1e relevant struc-
ture of' ti1.e corresponding natural-lancuace sentences, leav-
inc out irrelevant details o:f their uea:ninc;. T!1us it was 
assw:md that t:1e native speaker ( if' not the cra::!!:inrian) could 
often recogni~e a contradiction when ho sau one, and that he 
si:.Iilarly could recognize tautologies ii' they were not too 
co::1plicatecl, or too encw:1bered wi tl1 irrelevant details. 
A :further assm:1ption was that t:10 se::;,antic sense of' the 
native speal:er ,-m.s consistent, tlw .. t no r.:ativc spenlrnr would 
recognize both a sentence and its negation as true, or 
necessarily true. How the paradoxes ucrc considered to be 
exa::1ples of inconsistency in tl:e sm:iantico of' orc.li:1ary, 
intuitive lanauacc. 'i'here seems to be not::ing very esoteric 
about tho notion o:f a set; the ter::1 see::10 ::1orc the property 
of' the :;mn in the street than of the ::1athe1:1atician. It see::1s 
clear, !:1oreover, that t:1ere are sets t:1a t l1ave thc::1sel ves as 
1:1cr.1bern: the set of all sets l1avinc ::1ore than t1·10 nc::1bcrs 
clearly has ::1ore than two ::1e::1bers i tneli', ::;o t:1in aet ( w:1ich 
contains every set :10.vinc ::1ore than t1·ro ::ic1:1bcrs) is a ::1er.1ber 
of' i t::;elf'. Also, t:i.1.ere are sm:ie net::, u:·:ic:1 do not contain 
the::1selvcs as 1:101:1bers. The set of all countries in the United 
Hat ions is not itself a country beloncil1G to the United 
Nations. 
There is, t:::.en, at least one set w~:ich is not a 1:1er.1bcr of 
itself'. Consider 110,·1 the set of all non-seJ_f-,:1c::1bered sets. 
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It is possible, using the 1:1ethod of' rcductio ad absurdu1:1 
or indirect proof', to s:1ow that t::.is set io a ~cr.1ber of' 
itself. llo assu1:1e to begin with that 
( 1) The set of' all sets that arc not ::?e"1bero o:f the::1sel ves 
is not a 1:1e1:1ber of i tsel:f. 
This set ( call it N, f'or 11 non-sel:f-uc,:1bcred 11 ) has the property, 
according to ( 1), of' not being a 1:1c::1ber of i tsel:f. Dut the 
set lT is de:fined to include every set :!o.vinc; t:1is property, 
so on the asou::1ption that ( 1) is true, we have to conclude that 
H is a cocber o:f N - a fact wl1ich ( 1 ) denion. This is. the 
11 a~urdity" ·we need to sho,v that , .• e ,·rnre uronc; in o.osu::!inc (1). 
So ( 1) 4s :false, a.nd its negation in true: Ir ia a ;::10::1ber of' 
itself'. 
1 This last sentence is the step uhere 0-ppcaJ_ is ::1cdc to the 
principle of' indirect proof', and intuitiondi.st logicians do 
not accept t:::.is principle. In particular, tl!ey re:f-:..tsc to 
grant that if not-E. is false, then Pis true. It has ~een 
shown tl::.at t:.Lis ]_cads to an inf'ini te :i1u::1bcr of' truth-values 
insteacl of' t:20 usual tuo ( true a.nc.:. i'alne) . 
011f'ort1..111atoly, ,-,e can in tl10 sm:10 uay prove ( 1) by 
assu.::linc its nccrntio:n' 
( 1 1 ) Tho oet of all sets uhich are not ::1m:1bcrs of' the1:1-
sel vcs is a ue1:1ber of' itself. 
According to ( 1 ' ) , the set N is a !:?cnber o:f it ool:f. Du t in 
this case, tho sot lT lacks the property required of' all 
acr.ibers of IT, 11a::1cly tho property of' not bcil1c sclf-::1enbered. 
Since accordinc to (1 •) the set N doe~ot have the property 
c0!:n:1on to all and only the ,:1e1:1bers of N, it follo,-,s that the 
set N cannot be in the set N - that is, (1 1 ) is false because 
it leaas to a contradictory conclusion. Honea the negation 
of' ( 1 1 ) , nru:1ely ( 1), uust be true. T:!o upohot, then, of' 
these two indirect proof's is that the :~ost natural, intuitive 
de:fini tion of' 1 sot I and rela tad ter::1s leads ua to a 
contradiction. :Done a th tlle innocuoun-lool::i:1[_; surf'uce of' the 
notions of' set and ::1e::ibership, we ho.ve 1.1.ncovcrccl inconsistency; 
apparently everyd2.y languace is not, af'ter all, a consistent 
se!:1an tic syote~:1. 
T:lis, at any ra to, is tho uoral 1-,:·dcl1 ::mn! p:1ilooophers 
drm-1 :frm:1 set-theoretical and other -;_K1.radoxcs. And if the 
2r..ussell hinnelf seo,.1s to criticize t~1c parnc.lo;:cs, houever, as 
beinc based on a perversion of' tho ordinary use of' 'sot.' He 
clai::1s tllut it never uakes any senoe, in any lnnQ..1ac·c, to 
assort ( or deny) t:1at a set is a 1:101:1bcr o:f itself'. Thus he 
see:.:w to be fine.line f'aul t not with 2nglish or any other language, 
but rather wi t:1 ~:m.thcr.iaticians' f'or::mli::;a tion a.nd cxecesis of' 
the notions involved in the paradoxes. 
discovery of paradoxes in the gra:.:::1ar of' such card.en-variety 
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ttords as I sot I and 11:icaber' ,-,as not cnouch to nrouse tho 
interest of' loc;icians, the 1:iatllc;:m tic al i::1:1ortance of' the 
theory of' ::;ctn uas crood reason :for t:1e::1 to try to resolve 
the paradoxes. Georc Cantor, a Gcr::mn ~-.1atlleuatician of the 
ninetoont:1 century, llad cliscovercc: tl10 versatility of set 
theory ( ui tl1out bot!1erinc to for!:iali:;:;e t:ie t:1eory into any 
set of a:.::io:.rn), o..nd l1uf sell hi:.:.iself panticipatod in a 
de1:1onstration that all the tlleore1:1s of' t:10 theory of natural, 
inte6 ral, rational, real, and co1:1plc::-:: nµr.1bers, an well as the 
thcore::1s o:': the calculus, were proveable using only the 
1This stater:ient is subject to certain strictures i!:tposed by 
Goedel I s tl10orc1:1 about the inco1apletencss n.nd iI1co::1pletabili ty 
of' the ti1eory of natural nu::1bers. 
assumptions o:f set theory. What, t!-:.en, if tl:e :foundation of' 
1:1ost r.1atl101:1atics up to tl:c eiahteenth century turned out to be 
inconoistent? Could liather:1utic s be saved? Ii' so, it would 
have to be t:1roucll a resolution of' the para.doxoo of' set theory. 
The Discreteness Assumption oi' General Locic 
In pointinc out the eff'ect that vacuc11ons can have on 
argu::1onts, Dr. ':i'!10::1as is joininG the coed co::1pany of Hax 
Dlack, Ludt·Tig UittGenstein, and John Loc!::o ( as ueJ_l, I believe, 
as Russell hi::1scl:r). Locke pointed out t:11:'..t t:·wut;h ,-.re know 
the dif'f'ercnce bott·1oen a l1orse and a lu::1p of' lend, uc ::!icht 
be quite at a lons if a l1orse ,-rerc to ;)C c:1unGeC::. by barely 
perceptible decrees into a lu::1p of lead: at 1.·1hat point docs 
the thine cease to be Q horoc, and u:i.1en <loon it bcco::1e a 
lm:1p of lead? (iiow r:.mch hair 1.mst a nan lose to bcco!:1e bald?) 
For sir:dlar reasons, l/i ttgcnstein hold t:w.t for ::1ost ,-,ords, 
it is i,:1possible to give necessary nnd ::;uf:ficiont criteria 
f'or their applicc,tion to ite1!1s in our experience. IIo held, 
for oxro-:1plo, tl1at there arc .not any characteristics shnrod 
by all c;a..-:ics, .:i..nd only aa::1es, by virtue o2 u:1ic:1. we can 
def'ine the uorc.1 'cane' in a rigorous way. Rather, Uittgenstein 
2sicilarJ_y, s0?:1e phonoloc-ists hold tlw.. t phoncnes ::ray not be 
rigorously definable in tcr::1s of' features: tl1ere ::iay be no 
set of :features shared by all allop:1oncs of one pllone::~c, and 
by no allophone of' any other pllonC!:10. 
says, gar.10s boar a :fai:lily resc::1blunce to one another. uax 
Black :i.1an :::ado so::1e proposals about ::1eaourinc tl10 vacucness 
of 1.-rords, and a.bout incorporatinG vac;:}encss coc:fficicnts 
into the apparatus of sy1.ibolic logic. I understand that sor.10 
3Sce l1.is book, Lan{o;uage and P:dloso::>h.y. T:10 f'irst essay in 
tho book is intended to illustrate and e:::plnin what is ::1eant 
by the "lin[.;uistic ::1cthod 11 in pl1.ilosophy. 
Dri tish philosophers of tllo II ordinary lnnQlu6 c II sc:!ool have 
arcucd tho.t vnc;ueneno is n. property of' conoic:.e.;.~o.ble vn.lue to 
language co:.11:11.mi ties and users, that it is not at all a 
liability. 
on ::)T 4 
SIL-UND Workpapers 1970
Hith regard to so1~1e versions of' tlrn liar's paradox (e.g., 
"All 1:1en are liars", or "I'r.1 a liar but t:1at 1 s the truth"), 
the charGe of vagueness i;,1hicll Dr. 7:10:.:ms brinG"s is certainly 
telling, a~d. ~,hose versions are wortl1y o:f no ::!ore space than 
:;)r, ?hm.ias devotes to thc::1, because t~1ey arc so c:-:cecdingly 
weak ancl unconvincin6 • 
Sel:f-ref'erence and the Lia=.~' s Paradox 
It is not strictly speaking accurate to say t:1at 
gener~l locric pays no attention to discourse structure. One 
of' the principal coals of logic, in :fact, is precisely to 
def'i11c what constitutes a valid deductive proof', u:1ich is a 
discourse o:f a certain sort. IIowever, Dr. ':.':i.10!:ms' ::iistake at 
the becinnini:; of' section 2 of' his :)aper is hy ,"'!o :.:ca,.'1.s :fatal 
to :::.is arcunent in ti1at section. Just w:1at is that arc;u::ient? 
According to 'I'ho1:1as, there arc two syntactic requirer:ients 
:for use of uords such as 'lie 1 ( whet:1cr verb or noun) a11d 
'l:now 1 : first, there must be so::1e clause or assertion w!1.ich 
is said to be a lie, or wllic~1 is said to be l:no_wn, etc.; and 
second, the clause or assertion which is rc:forrcc! to as a lie 
must be clif:fcrcnt fro::1 tl1.c clause in ,·1~1ich tho ,·10rd 'lie' 
itscLr appears. In a word, utterances about lyinc or falsity 
cannot, in ~nglish, be self-referring. :Ienco the "sentences 11 
which ex.cupli:fy the liar's paradox arc not well-f'or::ied 
sentences of Enclish at all, and provinc contrD..dictions by 
i~1akinc use o:f these non-sentences docs not in tl10 least show 
that ~nclis:: is inconsistent ( in t:i.10 loc;icia.:ri' s sense), or 
that if' 3nglish is consistent then it consists of an infinite 
nu::1bcr o:f different languages. 
I should like to ::1alce three con::10nts on this position. 
First, it is not clear to ::1e why Tho::1ao refers to the alleged 
ill-:for::1cdness o:f the paradoxical sentences aa syntactic or 
gra.::u:mtical, rather than se;:mntic. If it is correct and 
necessary to state the second roquirc:.:cnt in tcr::1S of reference, 
that is what the uord 'lie' rof'ers to, thon we arc dealing with 
the sc::1a.ntic relation par excellence. Truth and f'alsi ty arc 
se1:1ar1tic properties of assertions, been.use it is necessary 
to 1:::now what an assertion means in order to check its truth 
value, and ordinarily it is necessary to look at the real-
1;-1orlcl situation whic:1. the assertion purports to describe 
(refer to) if' ,-10 wru1t to know whether or not a particuJ_ar 
assertion is a lie. For exa1:1ple, we can hardly rely on 
syntax alone to detcr::!inc tho wcll-.for!:lcdncss ( on Dr. Thomas' 
criteria) of' the sentence, 
(2) m1at I say at 4: 35 is :false. 
?llis sentence, Tl101:ms would prcsu1:mbly acrec, is perfectly 
good ~nglisl1 i:f (a•) I sn.y so!:1ct~linr, at that ::10;:icnt and (b) 
what I say is so:.icthing di:ffercnt fro::: (2) i tsel:f. j]ut 
to deter::1i11c uhcthcr either of' these rcqairc::1011ts is ::1et, 
I .au.st detcr1:1i110 ,1ha t ti:_10 it is, say by loo!:::ing- at the 
hands of' a clocl::, and I must find out w:1otllor at t!w right 
mo::1cnt ny lips arc ::1ovinc, proclucinc 00::10 asocrtion other 
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th::m. (2). Thus to determine whether (2) is well-formed, on 
Dr. Thomas' er teria, it necessary to have information that 
is clearly not syntactic information about this or any other 
sentence. For this reason, it seems to me that the kind of 
ill-formedness (if such it is) that Dr. Thomas is talking 
about is semantic rather than syntactic. 
Second, I suspect that though Thomas only claims that 
these are facts in English, he would be interested in defend-
ing any human language against paradox-hunters like Russel. 
It is not clear from the paper, but probably Thomas feels 
that if the rules of some language did permit words meaning 
'lie' or 'false' to be used in a self-referring way, then 
that language would contain paradoxes. Possibly Thomas would 
be willing to say, then, that the requirement that words like 
'lie' not refer to the clauses they appear in is a require-
ment of the semantics of all languages, and not just English. 1 
1on th~ whol~~--;hilosophers have been interested in semantic 
facts about a~l languages rather than in grammatical facts 
peculiar to only a few languages. In a way, the development 
of notation in symbolic logic can be seen as an attempt to 
transcribe or represent, in a language-independent way, the 
semantic structure of linguisitc structures, just as phonetic 
notation permits us to represent the sounds of utterances in 
a language-independent way. 
---·----------------------------------
Certain philosophers, in discussing Godel's proof of the 
incompleteness of arithmetic, have argued that the device 
of self-referring expressions, which is crucia~ to the proof, 
makes no sense (not even contradictory sense). Thus there 
2on this question,~ Popper (1954) and Ross (1969). 
--·--··--··. ··-
have been philosophers that have taken Thomas' position with 
respect to the "distribution" of 'false,.' 'lie, ' etc. in 
semantic structures in~ language. 
l"Iy third point is that Russell is one of these philoso-
phers, and that there is no fundamental disagreement between 
Russell and Thorn.as, except on the use of the locution "infi-
nite set of different languages" to describe a language 
built on the assumption that self-referring expressions are 
ill-fo~med in some way (perhaps semantically). What Russell 
means by this phrase is merely that a language must distin-
guish an infinite number of semantic levels or types of ex-
pressions, there are in Russell's set theory expressions 
that designate objects that are not sets, and these can be 
members of first-level sets. First-level sets, however, 
cannot be members of first-level sets, Russell says or we 
run the risk of generating paradoxes; for this reason, there 
must be second-level sets, and a separate set of expressions 
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in set theory to refer to these. Still, though, Russell 
would surely not have been justified in saying that set 
theory requires an infinite hierarchy of languages for its 
formulation, nor is there any reason to say that natural 
languages are any worse off than the formal language of set 
theory in this respect. 
This is just to say that more than Russell's intuition 
was sound when he said (if he did) that English was an infi-
nite set of different languages: the only thing that wasn't 
sound was his choice of words, since his intuition had lead 
him to analyze words like 'lie' in exactly the way that 
Thomas proposes. It may be, of course, that I have been 
guilty of the fault I thought to find in Thomas, it may be 
that I have simply taken too narrowly Thomas' use of the 
term intuition. 
One :i.ilore thing remains to be said. I did not mean, 
in the preceding paragraph, to be endorsing Russell's partic-
ular approach to the paradoxes of set theory, nor Thomas' 
entirely analogous approach to semantic paradoxes like the 
liar's paraa_ox. I confess that I have nothing very enlight--
ening to say about alternative set theories such as Zermelo's 
and von Neumann's, but I know that these do not involve the 
radical position taken by Russell, that self-membership is 
a meaningless concept, and I do know that these alternatives 
are able to avoid the paradoxes of set.theory just as well 
as Russell's theory of types. Perhaps, then, these more 
moderate versions of set theory could be adapted to the needs 
of semantics. In this way, linguists would be freed from 
the onus of having to argue for a rather radical philosoph-
ical position, viz. that self-referring expressions are al-
ways and in all languages semantically ill-formed, ie. mean-
ingless. 
Paul. I-iell.ez.1a 
5 Carey Ave., Apt. G-3 
Watertown, :Mass. 0?.172 
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